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DURESS AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL CASES
The Importance of the Subject
Duress per minas or compulsion by threats has not
been frequently invoked as a defense in criminal cases and,
as a consequence, the law concerning it is both meagre and
uncertain.' "Hardly any branch of the law," says a learn-
ed English writer,2 " * * * is more meagre or less satisfac-
tory than the law on this subject." Lord Denman once
told a jury,3 "You probably, -gentlenen, never saw two
men tried at a criminal bar for an offence which they had
jointly committed, where one of them had not been to a
certain extent in fear of the other, and had not been in-
fluenced by that fear in the conduct he pursued." There
is sufficient truth in this statement to render it remark-
able that there should have so seldom been occasion for
the courts to consider the defense of duress.
The English Royal Commissioners have said4 that this
defense is "one of every day ;" but certainly no justification
ZCoercion of a married woman by her husband will not be dis-
cussed.
22 Stephen, Hist. Crim. L., p. 105.
"Regina v. Tyler, 8 C. and P. 616 (1838).
4Report, Eng. R. Comm., p. 43, n. A.
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for this statement is to be found in the authorities. In
1882, Stephen5 was able to say, "There is very little au-
thority upon this subject. * * * Practically * * * the
subject is one of little importance." And, as recently as
1914, another English writer 6 declared that the defense,
according to the law of England, was of such limited and
doubtful application and rare occurrence "as to be scarce-
ly worth noticing in modern times." In the United States,
it has been said that examples of the defense of duress
"do not often occur,"'1 and the "adjudged cases are few in
number."'
It is conceded that the subject is one of "considerable
theoretical interest,"'9 and this, together with the recent
increase of its practical importance, caused by its more
frequent consideration by the courts 0 and legislatures fur-
nishes a sufficient warrant for a discussion of a subject
which Markby" declares, "Has never, as far as I am
aware, been discussed," and of which Stroud says,'12 "The
importance * * * has been exaggerated by eminent writ-
ers."
The Propriety of the Defense
The impropriety of adinitting duress as a defense in
any case has been seriously asserted. "No man," said an
eminent English judge, 3 "from a fear of consequences to
52 Stephen, Hist. Crim. L., pp. 106, 108.
6Stroud, Mens Rea, pp. 26, 264.
71 MeClain, Crim. L., Sec. 187.
'2 Lawson, Grim. Def., p. 636.
92 Stephen, Hist. Crim. L., p. 108.
-OThe subject has been considered in two classes of cases: (1)
Where the question was whether the defendant was excused because
he acted under duress; (2) where the question was whether the tes-
timony of one who participated in a crime under duress was to be re-
garded as that of an accomplice. See Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527, 15
S. E. 748 (1892).
"Markby, Elements L., 6 ed., p. 368.
2Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 26.
"Lord Denman, in Regina v. Tyler, supra.
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himself, has a right to make himself a party to commit-
ting mischief on mankind. * * * It cannot be too often re-
peated, that the apprehension of personal danger does not
furnish any excuse for assisting in doing any act which
is illegal." Sir James Stephen, after a forensic experience
of thirty years, during which he paid special attention to
'the criminal law, declared, "Compulsion by threats ought
in no case whatever to be admitted as an excuse for
crime."'14 A recent English writer has declared that the
defense "might with advantage be abolished."'15 The In-
dian Commissioners proposed, in the first draft of the
Indian Code, to eliminate duress as a defense to crime. The
Indian Code as published contains a section more lenient
than that first proposed.' 6
The criminal law, it is argued, is itself a system of
duress or compulsion; it is a collection of threats to the
life, liberty and property, of persons who commit crimes,
and such threats ought not to be withdrawn as soon as
they are encountered by opposing threats. The law which
says to a man intending murder, "If you do it, I will hang
you," should not withdraw its threat if someone else says,
"If you do not do it, I will shoot you."'
' 7
The premise of this argument is questionable and the
conclusion is unsound. The premise seems to be that
deterrence is the sole object of the criminal law."8 Diverse
are the opinions and vague is the general idea concerning
the specific object of punishment. Certainly no careful
scholar would at the present time venture to assert that
242 Stephen, Hist. Crim. L., p. 108.
"5Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 26.
6Report, Eng., R. Comm., p. 43, n. A.
"7See 2 Stephen, Hist. Crim. L., p. 107.
' 8"Surely," says Stephen, "it is at the moment when tempta-
tion to crime is strongest that the law should speak most clearly
and emphatically to the contrary." Such a proposition is correct
only if deterrence is the sole object of punishment. See McConnell,
Crim. Responsibility and Social Constraint, p. 68.
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the theories of criminal punishment current among our
judges and legislators have assumed a final and coherent
or even a temporarily stable form, or that deterrence has
been settled upon as the exclusive object of such punish-
ment.19
Perhaps the argument is that deterrence is one of the
objects-a very important object-of criminal punishment,
and that the furtherance of this object requires the exclu-
sion of duress as a defense. In this case the premise would
be justified by the authorities,2 0 but would not justify the
conclusion.
Punishment for deterrence should be inflicted only
where it is possible to deter. Where deterrence is im-
possible such punishment should be renounced. A man may
have motives adverse to the law and of such great strength
as to overcome any fear that can be inspired by the terror
of any legal punishment. He may be urged to the com-
mission of an act by motives more proximate and imperi-
ous than any sanction the law can hold out. In such cases,
as the threats of the law are necessarily ineffective, they
should not be made, and their fulfillment is gratuitQus
cruelty - the infliction of the needless and uncompensated
evil.
21
An American court2 ; has therefore well said:
ZMdConnell, Crim. Responsibility and Social Constraint, pp. 3,
4.
20'JIt is quite proper * * * to ascribe the first place among the
relative theories to the purpose of deterrence." Von Bar, Hist.
Cont. Crim. L., p. 514. "Punishment is before all things deterrent,
and the chief end of the law of crime is to make the evildoer an
example and a warning to all that are like-minded with him." Sal-
mond, Jurisp., 5 ed., p. 75.
2lAustin, Jurisp., p. 515. "Punishment itself must fail to at-
tain its great object where the evil it threatens is less than the evil
which would have been suffered if the crime had not warded it off."
Kenny, Crim. L., p. 74.
2 Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 South. 301, 19 L. R. A. 357, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 137 (1892).
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"That persons have exposed themselves to imminent
peril amd death for their fellow man, and that there are in-
stances where innocent persons have submitted to mur-
derous assaults and death rather than take life is well
established, but such self-sacrifices emanated from other
motives than fear of legal punishment. That fear of
punishment by imprisonment or death at some future day
by due process of law can operate with greater force to re-
strain or deter from its violation, than the fear of immedi-
ate death, unlawfully inflicted, is hardly reconcilable with
our knowledge and experience with that class of mankind,
who are controlled by no other higher principle than fear
of the law."
24
Whatever may ultimately be decided to be the proper
object of punishment, it is now a generally accepted prin-
ciple that punishment should be graduated according to
the character of the crime committed. 25 This idea is fre-
quently expressed by saying that punishment should be
just or reasonable.26 Applying this principle in the appli-
cation of the deterrent theory of punishment, it would
seem to follow that duress should be a defense whenever
it creates motives adverse to the law which cannot be con-
trolled by the threat of any reasonable punishment. The
criterion of responsibility should not be the powerlessness
of any possible but that of any reasonable punishment.
24"The dread of future penalties cannot be expected to prevail
over the certainty of present suffering." Odgers, Com. L. Eng., p.
124 "The reluctance with which English law admits duress by
threats to be an excuse for crime * * * shew again that deterrence
cannot be the sole object of punishment; for punishment is thus in-
flicted where the fear of it could not have sufficed to deter." Kenny,
Crim. L., p. 35.
25MCConnell, Crim. Responsibility and Social Constraint, pp. 7,
23, 62, 71. But see Garafalo, Criminology, p. 294.
26Victor Cousin, in a terse epigram, thus expresses the view
which is held by many people: "Punishment is not just because it
deters, but it deters because it is felt to be just.?
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Duress should excuse whenever the motive to crime cre-
ated by it is such as would necessarily countervail the fear
of any penalty which it is just and expedient that the law
should threaten. In such cases there is in theory nb suf-
ficient basis of criminal responsibility.
As a matter of fact, however, perhaps because of the
evidential difficulties, a limited scope has been given to the
defense of duress. In a very few cases can it be proved
with any degree of certainty that the possibility of self-
conitrol was really absent and that therefore the deed is
one for which the doer is rightfully irresponsible.
In this conflict between the requirements of theory
and the difficulties of practice, the law has resorted to a
compromnise. Most of the authorities are agreed that fear
created by threats of certain specified ways, constitutes a
defense to certain specified crimes. There is a consid-
erable difference of opinion among the writers, courts and
legislatures as to the character of the injury which must
be threatened, the manner in which the threats must be
made and the character of the crimes to which such threats
would constitute defense.
The Legal Content and Status of the Defense
The legal content and status of the defense of duress
can be best exposited by considering: (1) The crimes to
which it has been held to be a defense; (2) the character
of the injury which must be threatened; (3) the manner
in which the threats must be made.
Crimes to Which Duress is a Defense
Some writers assert that duress does not constitute a
defense to any crime.27  Others are apparently of the opin-
ion that duress may constitute a defense to every crime.
27Broom, Legal Maxims, p. 12. See also, Hoehheimer, Crim.
L., p. 32.
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"Always an act," says Bishop,28 "done from compulsion or
necessity is not a crime. To this doctrine there can be
and is no exception, it is universal." The view supported
by the majority of the writers is that duress is a defense
to some crimes but not to others. There is a considerable
difference of opinion as to the crimes included in each
class.
Blackstone says that duress is a defense to "positive
crimes, so created by the laws of society; and which there-
fore society may excuse; but not as to natural offences
so declared by the law of God, wherein human magistrates
are only the executioners of divine punishment." 0  'By
other writers it is said that duress is a defense "in some
cases ;,,31 "to some crimes ;,,32 "to minor crimes ;,933 "when
the crime is not of a heinous character ;1134 "for many
crimes ;,,35 "to all but the gravest crimes ;"6 "for commit-
ting most, if not all, crimes, except the taking of the life
of an innocent person ;37 "for any crime except murder."
3S
A somewhat similar difference of opinion is to be
found in the decisions of the courts. "Duress," says an
American court, "relieves from responsibility for
crime."39  "That circumstance," says an English court,
"has never been received by the law as an excuse for * * *
281 Bishop, New Crim. L., 8 ed., Sec. 346.
304 Blackstone, Corn. 30. This passage has been cited as an il-
lustration of Blackstone's weakness in all matters of speculation. 2
Stephen, Hist. Crim. L., p. 106.
SiRussel, Crimes, int. ed., p. 145.
32Kenny, Crim. L., p. 73.
3aRood, Crim. L., p. 54.
34Report, Eng. R. Comm., p. 43, n. A.
354 Stephen, Com., p. 27.
360dgers, Com. L. Eng., p. 123.
388 R. C. L. 125; note, 106 Am., St. Rep. 721.
3EClarke, Elementary L., p. 124; Clarke, Crim. L., p. 99.
39State v. Saunders, 10 Tex. App. 632.
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crime."40  Neither of these statements seems to be accu-
rate. The present doctrine of the English courts, as stated
in a recent and authorative work,4' is that duress is a de-
fense to the crime of "joining with rebels" but to no other
crime.42  In the United States the prevailing doctrine
seems to be that duress is a defense to all crimes except
murder.
43
Treason
It has been held in both the United States and Eng-
land that duress is a permissible defense in prosecutions
for treason.44  Sir Walter Scott said that treason often
"arises from mistaken virtue and therefore cannot be con-
sidered disgraceful," but it is not because of the veniality
of the offefise that duress is an allowable defense. The
common law ranks treason as the most heinous of all
crimes. 45  Blackstone declared 46 it to be "the highest civil
crime which * * * any man can possibly commit ;" and a
recent authority asserts that treason is such a heinous
crime that the courts "have been loath to recognize de-
fense thereto.14 7 It is rather remarkable, therefore, that
in England treason should have been selected as the one
crime to which duress is an allowable defense 4 8 and that in
the United States duress should have been selected as the
one defense which is allowable in treason.40
4ORegina v. Tyler, supra.
439 Halsbury, L. Eng. 243.
42But -in Kenny, Crim. L., p. 73, it is said, "It is impossible to
say with precision for what offenses the defense will be allowed to
avail."
438 R. C. L. 125, and cases cited infra.
44United States v. Greiner, 4 Phila. 396, Fqd. Cas. 15262 (1861);
United States v. Vigol, 2 Dall. 346 (1795); Respublica v. McCarty
(Pa.), 2 Dall. 86 (1781); McGrowther's Case, Foster C. L. 13 (1746).
4528 Am. and Eng. Eng. L., 2 ed., 457.
464 Blackstone, Com. 75.
4738 Cyc. 957.
4 Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 264; 9 Halsbury, L. Eng. 243.
49A recent authority so asserts. 38 Cyc. 957. Sed quere!
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Duress was invoked as a defense in a number of prose-
cutions for treason growing out of the Scottish rebellion in
1746, and "though most of those who set up the defense
must have fought in actual battle, and must have killed
or assisted in killing, and so brought themselves within
the stern rule laid down by Hale, 0 it was never suggested
that this made a difference. ' ' 1
It is stated by some of the English authorities that du-
ress is only a defense for some of the minor forms of
treason.1  Thus East says,2 "Such compulsion or fear, how-
ever, is no excuse for any other sort of treason than that
of joining with rebels or enemies." A peculiarity of this
kind of treason, which is the only kind recognized in the
United States, is that it may be a continuing crime. In
such case, it must appear that the duress continued
throughout the whole time the defendant was assisting the
enemy or rebels. Thus, where the defendant was charged
with treason in joining and marching with rebels and the
only duress shown was ol August 28th, and he continued
with the rebels until December 30th, it was held that he
was not excused.3
East says :
4
"It may perhaps be impossible to account for every
day, week, or month; and therefore it may be sufficient to
excuse him if he can prove an original force upon him, that
he in earnest attempted to escape and was prevented, or
that he was so narrowly watched, or the passes so guarded,
that an attempt to escape or to refuse his assistance would
have been attended with great difficulty and danger; and,
if the circumstance will admit of it, that he quitted the ser-
s"Duress does not excuse killing an innocent man.
5'Report, Eng. R. Comm., p. 43, n. A.
'Keeny, Crim. L., p. 73; Odger, Com. L. Eng., p. 124.
21 East, P. C. 71.
3McGrowther's Case, Foster C. L. 13 (1746).
41 East, P. C. 70, 71.
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vice as soon as he could; so that upon the whole he may
fairly be presumed to have continued amongst them
against his will, though not constantly under an actual
fear of immediate death. * * * In this respect there is no
distinction between serving as an officer or private man,
further than the accepting a command in a rebel army is
a stronger evidence of willingness than the other."
Homicide
It has frequently been asserted that duress does not
excuse "the killing of an innocent person." "The authori-
ties seem to be conclusive," says the Alabama court,5 "that,
at common law, no man can excuse himself, under the plea
of necessity or compulsion, for taking the life of an inno-
cent person." 6  The question has been discussed by the
text writers more frequently than by the courts.7  The
former are practically unanimous in declaring that "no
man can excuse himself, under the plea of necessity or
compulsion, for taking the life of an innocent person."9
The correctness of this doctrine has been questioned
by several writers. "According to Lord Hale," says East,'0
5Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 South, 301, 19 L. R. A. 357, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 137 (1892)4
,Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S. W. 773 (1004); State v. Nar-
gashian, 26 R. I. 299, 58 AI. 953, 106 Am. St. Rep. 715, 3 Ann. Cas.
1026 (1904); State v. Fisher, 23 Mont. 540, 59 Pac. 919 (1900); Re-
gina v. Tyler, supra; People v. Martin, 13 Cal. App. 96, 108 Pac.
1034 (1910); Rainey v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 390, 40 S.
W, 682 (1897); Leach v. State, 99 Tenn. 584, 42 S. W. 195 (1897).
sBrewer v. State, supra.
98 R. C. L, 125; 13 R. C. L. 708; 21 Cyc. 832; Wharton, Homicide,
3 ed., Sec. 52; .1 Hale, P. C. 51, 433; 1 Russel, Crimes, Sec. 696; 4
Blackstone, Com. 30; note, 3 Ann. Cas. 1028; note, 106 Am. St. Rep.
721; Bishop, New Crim. L., 3 ed., Sec. 346; Robinson, Am. Jurisp.,
Sec. 45; Hawley and McGregor, Crimes, p. 2; Harris, Crim. L., p.
31; Clark, Crim. L., p. 100; Clark and Marshall, Crimes, 2 ed., p. 127.
1 East, P. C. 294.
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"a man cannot even excuse the killing of another who is
innocent, under a threat however urgent of losing his own
life unless he comply. But if the commission of treason
may be extenuated by fear of present death, and while the
party is under actual compulsion, there seems to be no
good reason why this offence may not also be mitigated
upon the like consideration of human infirmity."'1
The argument of East was unsuccessfully relied upon
by the defendant in a comparatively recent case. 2 Indict-
ed for murder, the accused argued that "if duress is a de-
fense in treason it should also apply in murder." The
court was able to discover two distinctions between treason
and murder: (1) Treason is a continuing crime and
murder is not; (2) treason is a "positive crime, so created
by the laws of society," and murder is "a natural offense
so declared by the law of God." Concerning the first dis-
tinction the court said, "Treason is usually a continuing
act from which there is a possibility of escape * * *. The
mere fear of death, therefore, may well be allowed when
a loyal intent may be shown by a possible speedy return to
allegiance. But murder is a consummated act, irreparable
after commission, and hence to be guarded against by a
stricter rule." Concerning the second distinction, the
court quoted the statement of Blackstone to the effect that
duress is only a defense to crime "created by the laws of
society, and which, therefore, society may excuse," and
not to the "natural offenses so declared by the law of
God, wherein human magistrates are only the executioners
of divine punishment."'1
,S-ee also, 1 Russell, Crimes, 3d Eng. ed., p. 664; Bishop, New
Crim. L., 3 ed., Sec. 348.
"State v. Nargashian, supra.
"3Another distinction, it is said, is that the crime of treason
consists rather in the intent than in the enormity of the crime it-
self. 1 M Clain, Crim. L., Sec. 127.
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The killing of an innocent person, if criminal, may be
either murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary
manslaughter. There are no cases in which it is decided,
or even expressly stated, that a killing which would other-
wise be manslaughter may not be excused if it was com-
mitted under duress. The homicide cases have all been
prosecutions for murder. In none of them has duress
been successfully invoked as a defense. The decisions and
dicta in these cases are, therefore, relied upon as author-
ity for the proposition that duress will not excuse a kill-
ing which would otherwise be murder.'
One may incur responsibility for murder in various
ways. He may commit the act which causes death or sim-
ply aid and abet another who commits such act. In either
case the person who does the killing may or may not intend
to kill. If the person who does the killing intends to kill,
the person who aids and abets may or may not know of
such intention.
The cases furnish specific answers to only a few of the
problems to which these various situations give rise. They
simply determine, by dicta rather than by decision, that
one who intentionally kills an innocent person or who aids
and abets another who does so, with knowledge of the
latter's intent, cannot exempt himself from responsibility
for murder by proving that he acted under duress. 15
At common law, and under various statutes, a killing
resulting from the perpetration of, or attempt to perpe-
trate, a felony is murder. This is true although there was
no intention to kill and although the acts done were not
such as would ordinarily be attended by death. This rule
gives rise to the following question: If one is compelled by
14 Kenny, Crim. L., p. 73; Clark, Elementary L., p. 24.
1.5tate v. Fisher, supra; Arp v. State, supra; Brewer v. State,
supra; Leach v. State, supra; State v. Nargashian, supra; People v.
Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 61 N. W. 861 (1895); Rizzolo v. Common-
wealth, 126 Pa. 54, 17 Atl. 520 (1889). But see Regina v. Tyler,
supra.
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duress to join in the commission of a felony to which du-
ress is a defense, and during its commission an innocent
person is unintentionally killed by the threatener or per-
son threatened, may duress be successfully invoked as a
defense in a prosecution of the latter for murder? An an-
swer is found in a recent case.16 Statutes provided that
duress was a defense to all crimes but murder, and that a
killing was murder "when committed * * * without a de-
sign to effect death, by a person engaged in the commis-
sion of, or in attempt to commit, * * * robbery." The
court held that a person who was present, aiding in a rob-
bery which was actually committed by another, in the com-
mission of which the victim was killed by such other, could
not invoke the defense of duress when he was prosecuted
for murder.
The defendant argued that duress was a defense be-
cause it was a defense to robbery, which was the only crime
in which he participated. The court held that as to rob-
bery the defendant was "in the same situation as if he
had physically done every act constituting that robbery,"
and that it followed, since the killing was committed by
one of the defendant's confederates while in the act of
committing the robbery, the defendant was "as much re-
sponsible for the killing as he is for the robbery," and that,
since the statute expressly excluded duress as a defense
to murder, he was responsible for the murder.
The fallacy of this argument is apparent. A killing
by a person engaged in committing robbery was murder,
but as duress was a defense to robbery, the defendant, if
he acted under duress, was not committing robbery, and
therefore his responsibility for murder cannot be predict-
ed upon the assumption that he was committing robbery.
If, as stated by the court, he was as much responsible for
the murder as he was for the robbery, it would follow that
he was not responsible for the murder, because, as duress
'(State v. Moretti, 66 Wash. 537, 120 Pac. 102 (1912).
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was a defense to robbery, he was not responsible for the
robbery.
With much better reason, therefore, it has been held
in a prosecution for murder, based upon a killing by an
accomplice while "robbing a house," that if the defendant
"had consented only to the robbing of the house and not to
the killing, and at the time of his participation in the rob-
bing had reasonable ground to believe that his life was
immediately to be taken unless he participated," he was
not guilty of murder.17
There are intimations in some of the cases that du-
ress, though it does not excuse a homicide, may reduce its
grade.'" The Pennsylvania court seems to be of the opin-
ion that where a wilful, deliberate and premeditated in-
tent to kill is an essential element of murder in the first
degree, duress may preclude a conviction for that crime.
In a prosecution for murder the trial court instructed the
jury, "But in case you should find * * * that the shots
were not inflicted by the defendant, then you will inquire
whether or not the acts which he performed there were
coerced by fear * * *; whether that explanation which has
been given by the defendant is such as would show that
he had not the power to form the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated intent to take life * * *." The appellate
court said, "The question whether the defendant was act-
ing under duress * * * was submitted to the jury under
'TBaxter v. People, 8 fll. 368 (1846). Especially if it appeared
that the robbery was committed when there was no probability of
loss of life being its consequence.
18Mikell, Cr.im. Cas., p. 76; note, 106 Am. St. Rep. 723. "No-
where have we found an express holding that such is the law."
Note, 106 Am. St. Rep. 723. The question was expressly left un-
decided in Brewer v. State, supra. In State v. Nargashian, supra,
it is said, "If one has sufficient power of mental action to put his
own chances of safety against the life of an innocent third person,
his act can neither be entitled to excuse nor reduction on the ground
of fear."
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proper instructions as to its effect upon the degree of
guilt.'
91
Duress will not reduce a killing which would other-
wise be murder to voluntary manslaughter. In answer
to the contention that fear, like passion, may so becloud
the mind as to eliminate malice, it has been said, "The
comparison of the two elements of action is not apt. One's
own passion is not a defense to reduce a crime unless it
is caused by provocation, like a fight or a gross indignity,
between the victim and the assailant. Passion induced
by a third person would be no defense to a homicide. So
fear induced by one person is no defense to a defendant
who kills another under its influence.1
20
In some states there are statutes which declare in gen-
eral terms that duress is a defense to crime. It seems
that under such a statute duress may excuse the killing of
an innocent person.
2 1
Other Crimes
There are decisions or dicta to the effect that duress
is defense to arson,23 burglary 24 bigamy,25 mutiny, 
6 riot,2'
and "dynamiting a house.128 Probably the crime of rob-
bery may be excused on the ground of duress. 29 In regard
to a prosecution for robbery the Alabama court said, "We
19Rizzolo v. Commonwealth, supra. The court added, "We need
not pursue this branch of the case further."
2 State v. Nargashian, supra.
2lParis v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 82, 31 S. W. 855 (1895).
"We do not interpret this case as expressly so holding." Note,
106 Am. St. Rep. 723.
23Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388; 82'N. E. 781 (1907).
24Beal v. State, 72 Ga. 200 (1883).
2-5Burton v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. Rep. 196, 101 S. W. 226 (1907).
26United States v. Haskell, Fed. Cas. 15, 321 (1823).
27Pennsylvania v. Mornison (Pa.), Add. 274 (1795); Rex v.
Crutchley, 5 C. and P. 133 (1832).
2 People v. Martin, 13 Cal. App. 96, 108 Pac. 1034 (1910).
29 Note, 106 Am. St. Rep. 721.
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are not to be understood as intimating * * * that the de-
fendant would have been excusable if he had acted under
duress of life or great bodily harm."30  Duress may be a
defense to perjury."' An answer to the question of the
Georgia court, "Is perjury, committed in a legal tribunal
in the midst of officers and ministers of the law, with full
opportunity to demand surety of the peace, and appeal
to th6 state for protection, one of the offense for which
fear is an excuse? ' '32 is furnished by Saunders v.
State, 13 where a judgment upon a plea of guilty made in
open court was reversed and a new trial granted because,
in the opinion of the appellate court, the plea was made
under duress. It has been suggested that duress is not a
defense to rape. "'Human infirmity' ought not to be
tolerated by our laws to the extent of excusing one for
the violation of female virtue on the plea of danger to
himself however great or imminent.
' '3 4
In some jurisdictions the crimes to which duress is a
defense are specified by statute. In Texas it is a defense
to all crimes ;35 in Washington and Minnesota to any crime
except murder ;" in California to all but capital crimes ;37
in Canada to all crimes except treason, murder, piracy, at-
3OThomas v. State, 134 Ala. 126, 33 South. 130 (1902).
3'Bain v. State, 67 Miss. 557, 7 South. 408 (1890); McCoy v.
State, 78 Ga. 490, 3 S. E. 768 (1887). See also, Ross v. State, 169
Ind. 388, 82 N.. E. 781 (1907).
32McCoy v. State, supra.
33Supra.
34State v. Dowell, 106 N. C. 722, 11 S. F. 525 (1890).
35Paris v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 82, 31 S. W. 855 (1895).
36State v. Moretti, 66 Wash. 537, 120 Pac. 102 (1912); Minn.
Stat. (1894), Sec. 6307.
37People v. Martin, supra.
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tempt to murder, assisting in rape, forcible abduction, rob-
bery, causing grievous bodily harm, and arson.1
8
The Threatened Injury
Duress may be of different degrees. It is well set-
tled that not every degree is sufficient to constitute a
defense to crime;'9 but the authorities are not agreed as
to the character of the injury which must be threatened
in order that duress may constitute a defense.
Attempts to generalize have been made. "Generally,
an act or omission is not a crime," it is said,40 "or is more
or less excusable, if it proceeded from an instant and well
grounded fear stronger than the fear naturally inspired
by the law." This statement is vague and uncertain and
"has never been accepted as a principle of general applica-
tion in our law."41
The defense of duress in criminal cases has been said
to be analogous to duress in the case of contracts ;42 but
it has been decided that duress which is sufficient to ren-
der voidable a contract or sale is not necessarily sufficient
to excuse a crime. "It must be obvious to the deliberate
judgment of every reflecting mind," says the Georgia
court, ' "that much less freedom of will is requisite to ren-
der a person responsible for crime than to bind him by
a sale or other contract. To overcome the will, so far as
to render it incapable of contracting a civil obligation, is a
38Canadian Crim. Code, Sec. 20, 55, 56 V. c. 29, Sec. 12. Con-
cerning a similar section in the Draft Code of England, the Royal
Commissioners said, "We have framed this section to express what
we think is the existing law, and what at all events ought to be the
law." Report, Eng, R. Comm., p. 45, n. A.
39Robinson, Elementary L., 535, and authorities infra. But see
Wharton, Crim. L., Sec. 1803a.
4OAustin, Jurisp., p. 1061. See also, Harris, Crim. L., p. 21.
41Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 258.
421 McClain, Crim. L., Sec. 136.
43McCoy v. State, 78 Ga. 490, 3 S. E. 768 (1887), quoted in Ross
v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 82 N. E. 781 (1907).
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mere trifle compared with reducing it to that degree of
slavery and submission which will exempt from punish-
ment."44
A contrary doctrine has recently been asserted. 45 Upon
the trial of one for "selling pooled tobacco," in which the
defense relied upon was duress, the trial court charged that
by the term duress is meant "such threats or violence * * *
as are calculated to operate on a person of ordinary firm-
ness and inspire a just fear of great injury, to person, repu-
tation, or property." The appellate court, quoting and re-
lying entirely upon civil cases, where the question was
whether a contract or sale was avoided by duress, declared
that "the instruction presented for the consideration of the
jury fairly and fully the law of the case." 46
In determining the character of the injury which must
be threatened, the personal peculiarities of the particular
defendant have not been considered. The test has been
not whether threats of such an injury are sufficient to
arouse the requisite fear in such a man as the defendant
but whether they are sufficient to so affect men of ordinary
fortitude and courage. The question has been regarded, in
absence of statute, as one of law for the court, and in ans-
wering it the courts have usually designated certain specific
44By statute duress sufficient to avoid a contract or sale con-
sisted of "threats of bodily or other harm, or other means * * *
tending to coerce the will of another and actually inducing him to
do an act contrary to his free will." Code, Sec. 2637. To render
duress a defense to crime there must have been threats or menaces
which sufficiently show that life or member was in danger, etc.
Code, Sec. 4303. To instruct a jury in a criminal case that duress
is a defense and at the same time define duress as in Sec. 2637,
is erroneous.
45Commonwealth v. Reffitt, 149 Ky. 300, 148 S. W. 48, 42 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 329 (1912).
46The character of the criminal act charged may have influenced
the court.
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kinds of injury as being the only ones sufficient in the
eyes of the law to arouse such fear.
Some courts declare that the injury threatened must
be death.47 Other courts hold that the injury may be either
death, or "great" or "serious" or "grievous" bodily harm.48
Possibly most of the authorities cited can be reconciled by
holding that only threats of death are sufficient to excuse
treason, but that threats of death or great bodily harm
are sufficient to excuse other crimes.49 A slight or infer-
47United States v. Haskell, supra (mutiny); Respublica v. Me-
,Carty, supra (treason); United States v. Greiner, supra (treason);
Baxter v. People, supra (murder); McGrowther's Case, supra (treas-
on). "The fear, which the law recognizes as an excuse for the per-
petration of an offence, must proceed from an immediate and actual
danger, threatening the very life of the party." United States v.
Vigol, supra (treason). See also, 10 Am. and Eng. Enc. L., 2 ed.,
347; 8 R. C. L. 125; Hawley and McGregor, Crimes, p. 2. Statutes
sometimes declare that the injury must be one which endangers life.
Pen. Code, Cal., Sec. 26; People v. Martin, supra.
4 8People v. Repke, 106 Mich. 459, 61 N. W. 861 (1895). "If a
person is compelled to commit a crime by threats * * * of death or
serious bodily harm * * * this excuses him." 'Ross v. State, 169
Ind, 388, 82 N. E. 781 (1907). See also, Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527,
15 S. E. 748 (1892); Thomas v. State, 134 Ala. 126, 33 South. 130
(1902); 12 Cyc. 161; Stephen, Dig. Crim. L., Sec. 31; 1 McClain,
Crim. L. Sec. 137; Desty, Am. Crim. L., p. 32; Clark, Elementary
L., p. 124; 4 Stephens Com., p. 27; Kenny, Crim. L. p. 73; Clark
and Marshall, Crimes, 2 ed., Sec. 83; Wharton, Crim. L., Sec. 124.
Statutes sometimes declare that the injury may be either death or
loss of limb or member or great personal injury or grievous bodily
harm. Pen. Code, Ga., Seo. 4303; McCoy v. State, 78 Ga. 490, 3 S.
E. 768 (1887); Burns v. State, supra; Paris v. State, 35 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 82, 31 S. W. 855 (1895); Canadian Crim. Code, Sec. 20, 55,
56, V. c. 29, Sec. 12; Rem. and Bal. Wash. Code, Sec. 2256.
493 Modern Am. L., p. 16. But see Clark and Marshall, Crimes,
2 ed., p. 127.
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ior physical injury-anything short of death or great bod-
ily harm-is not sufficient in any case.50
The loss or destruction of, or any outrage upon, real or
personal property, is not, according to the great weight of
authority, sufficientA' In an early Pennsylvania case,1
however, the court seemed to be of the opinion that one
who was indicted for riotously raising a liberty pole could
invoke as his defense the fact that a mob had threatened
to destroy the town if a liberty pole was not raised, and in
a recent Kentucky case 2 the court charged that one indict-
ed for selling pooled tobacco was not guilty if he acted
under a just fear of great injury to person, reputation or
property.
3
It has been said that "in accepting duress as an ex-
cuse for criminal acts, the law rules the more stringently
in proportion to the enormity of the offense committed
and its natural effect upon the welfare of society; ' '4 and
that "the more enormous the crime, the higher is the de-
mand which the law makes on the self restraint of the act-
or." 5
saRespublica v. MiCarty (Pa.), 2 Dall. 86 (1781); United States
v. Vigol, 2 Dal. 346 (1795); 8 R. C. L. 125; 12 Cyc. 161.; Clark,
Elementary L., p. 124; 4 Stephen, Com., p. 27. "The apprehension
of slight injury furnishes no excuse." United States v. Vigol, supra.
51United States v Greiner, 4 Phila. 396, Fed. Cas. 15,262 (1861);
United States v. Vigol, supra; Respublica v. McCarty, supra; Mc-
Growther's Case, Foster C. L. 13 (1746); 8 R. C. L. 125; Clark and
Marshall, Crimes, p. 127; 12 Cyc. 161; 1 MeClain, Crim.. L, See. 137;
Clark, Crim. I, p. 100; 1 East, P. C., p. 71; 4 Stephen, Com., p. 27;
Desty, Am. Crim. L., Sec. 32b.
'Pennsylvania v. Morriaon (Pa.), Add. 274 (1795).
2Commonwealth v. Reffitt, 149 Ky. 300, 148 S. W. 48, 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 129 (1912).
!But the court seemed to be of the opinion that there was fear
of physical injury as well as fear of injury to property.
4Robinson, Am. Jurisp., Sec. 45.
5Robinson, Elementary L., Sec. 470.
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The authorities already cited demonstrate, however,
that the courts have not carefully graduated the injury
which must be threatened to the enormity of the crime
for which it is invoked as excuse. The most that can be
said is that the courts have made a somewhat illogical at-
tempt at such graduation by declaring that duress is not
an excuse for murder; that only threats of death excuse
treason; that threats of death or great bodily harm ex-
cuse other crimes; and, perhaps, that threats of great in-
jury to reputation or property excuse crimes involving
slight moral turpitude and injury.6
The Apprehension of Injury
In order that an act which would otherwise be criminal
may be excused because committed under duress, the per-
son committing it must have actually believed, in good
faith, that unless he did so, an injury of the kinds previ-
ously specified would be inflicted upon him, and he must
have acted solely because of this belief.7
In determining this, it is proper to consider the age,
power of will, courage and intelligence of the defendant
as exhibited by himself on the witness stand and as shown
by other witnesses.8 The fact that he was weak in will
6This statement, although it reconciles many of the cases, is not
expressly supported by any case.
Pirkle v. State, 11 Ga. App. 98, 74 S. E. 709 (1912); Arp v.
State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 South. 301, 19 L. R. A. 367, 38 Am. St. Rep. 137
(1892); People v. Martin, 13 Cal. App. 96, 108 Pac. 1034 (1910);
Canadian Crim. Code, Sec. 20; Pen. Code, Cal., Sec. 26; Ga. Code
(1882), See. 4303; Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 82 N. E. 781 (1907).
Where the defendant offered to prove that a short time before the
commission of the alleged offense, "one Ray drew a revolver on!'
her and threatened to kill her, thereby "putting her in fear," the
court held that the evidence was properly rejected as there was noth-
ing in the offer to show that the act of Ray in drawing his revolver
and threatening to kill the defendant had anything to do with her
committing the crime charged. Ross 1. State, supra.
8Rizzolo v. Commonwealth, 126 Pa. 54, 17 Atl. 520 (1889).
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power, easily persuaded, timid and shy," or that he was
an infant of tender years 0 is admissible to prove that he
acted under the influence of fear. The question is one of
fact for the jury. 1
The Reasonableness of the Apprehension
The belief of the defendant must have been reason-
able. 2 It must have been based upon reasonable "cause"
or "ground," "such, qui cadere possit in virum constantem,
non timidum et meticulosum," as Bracton expresses it in
the words of the civil law.'3 "The social system would be
subverted and there would be no protection for persons or
property," says the Mississippi court,14 "if the fear of man
needlessly and cravenly entertained should be held to justi-
fy or excuse breaches of the criminal law of the state."
The test of the reasonableness of the belief is not
whether it was reasonable in such a man as the defendant,
but whether it would have been reasonable in a reasonable
man,'15 of ordinary fortitude and courage. 6  It is diffi-
cult to apply this test. The exceptional nature of the
circumstances which impelled the defendant to commit the
crime renders it difficult to compare him with a reasonable
DRoss v. State, supra.
1OBeal v. State, 72 Ga. 200 (1883).
"Rizzolo v. Commonwealth, supra; Commonwealth v. Reffitt,
supra; Beale v. State, supra; Prikle v. State, supra; McCoy v. State,
supra.
'?People v. Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 61 N. W. 861 (1895); State
v. Nargashian, 26 R. I. 299, 58 Atl. 9.53, 106 Am. St. Rep. 715, 3 Ann.
Cas. 1026 (1904); Baxter v. People, 8 Ill. 368 (1846); Rizzolo v. Com-
monwealth, supra; Pen. Code, Cal., Sec. 26; People v. Martin, 13 Cal.
96, 108 Pac. 1034 (1910); Ga. Code (1882) Sec. 4303; Rem. and Bal.
Wash. Code, Sec. 4303; Burns v. State, supra; State v. Moretti, supra;
Minn. Stat. (1894) Sec. 6307.
"14 Blackstone, Com. 30.
14Bain v. State, 67 Miss. 545, 7 South. 408 (1890).
' 5Rizzolo v. Commonwealth, supra.
l6United States v. Haskell, Fed. Cas. 1532 (1823); note, 3 Ann.
Cas. 1028; 10 Am. and Eng. Enc. L., 2 ed. 347.
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man, since we are unable to say with any certainty what
would have been the conduct of this theoretical man in the
same situation. The juror must first imagine a reason-
able man, and then decide what would be a reasonable be-
lief for this reasonable man, and then, still performing the
functions of a psychologist, he must compare this belief
with the belief of the defendant. The decided cases fur-
nish little aid. They furnish illustrations of beliefs which
the courts have held to be reasonable or unreasonable, but
they furnish no portraits of the "reasonable man."
The Imminence of the Threatened Injury
The danger must have been, or must have been be-
lieved by the defendant upon reasonable grounds to be,
"present, imninent and impending" at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime.'7 A future, remote or
prospective danger is not sufficient,'8 and evidence of such
danger is therefore properly rejected.' 9 This rule applies
'17 Bain v. State, supra; Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 82 N. E. 781
(1907); Pirkle v. State, 11 Ga. App. 98, 74 S. E. 709 (1912); Baxter
v. People, 8 I1. 368 (1846); Arp. v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 South. 301,
19 L. R. A. 357, 38 Am. St. Rep. 137 (1892); People v. Repke, 103
Mich. 459, 61 N. W. 861 (1895); Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527, 15 S. E.
748 (1892); Burton v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. Rep. 196, 101 S. W. 226
(1607); People v. Martin, 13 Cal. App. 96, 108 Pac. 1034 (1910);
Clark and Marshall, Crimes, 2 ed., p. 127; Clark, Crim. L., p. 100.
Statutes sometimes so provide. Burns v. State, supra; Burton v.
State, supra; McCoy v. State, 78 Ga. 490, 3 S. E. 768 (1887); State
v. Moretti, 66 Wash. 537, 120 Pac. 102 (1912); Paris v. State, 35 Tex,
Cr. Rep. 82, 31 S. W. 855 (1895); 10 Am. and Eng. Enc. L., 2 ed.,
346.
1812 Cyc. 161; Carlisle v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 108, 38 S.
W. 991 (1897); Arp. v. State, supra; Ross v. State, supra; People v.
Martin, supra; People v. Repke, supra; Clarke and Marshall, Crimes,
2 ed., p. 127; Stephen, Dig. Crim. L., See, 31; Wharton, Crim. L., See.
124.
'9People v. Martin, supra.
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irrespective of the character of the person threatened. The
fact that he was a minor does not exempt him from its op-
eration.
2 0
It is said that this rule is grounded on sound reason
and enlightened justice, and a contrary rule would be
monstrous and unjust.21 An analogue is found in the law
of self-defense. "If the right of self-defense and forcible
resistance against an aggressor exists only in the presence
of imminent danger or when an offense is about to be com-
mitted, it would be an anomalous condition of the law that
would justify or excuse the commission of a felony against
the person or property of an entirely innocent person be-
cause the person doing the deed had reason to fear and did
fear, not an imminent and immediate danger * * * but
a future and remote danger and one that in the very na-
ture of things could be averted by innocent methods."
23
The reason for the rule is asserted to be that unless
the danger is imminent and impending the defendant has
the power to protect himself from it and can appeal to
the law for protection.
24
The rule was therefore very properly relaxed in a re-
cent case.25 It appeared that night riding had been going
on in the country and a highly excited condition prevail-
ed; that the civil authorities were, in many instances,
wholly unable to preserve order and prevent acts of vio-
lence and lawlessness and the destruction of property; and
that the local authorities, even when supplemented by the
entire military power of the state, were unable to restore
order or prevent the perpetration of gross outrages upon
the persons and property of those antagonistic to the suc-
cess of the night riders. It was properly held that a
2oPeople v. Martin, supra.
2'People v. Martin, supra.
23People v. Martin, supra.
24Bain v. State, supra.
25Commonwealth v. Reffitt, 149 Ky. 300, 148 S. W. 48, 42 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 129 (1912).
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crime committed under a fear of injury inspired by threats
of the night riders was excused even though the danger
was not imminent and impending at the time of the com-
mission of the crime.
26
The apprehension of immediate danger must have con-
tinued during the whole time the crime was being com-
mitted. 27  This is particularly true of continuing crimes
such as treason. The defendant must show that the ap-
prehension of immediate injury continued throughout the
whole time he was assisting the enemy and that he "quit-
ted the service as soon as he could; agreeable to the rule
laid down in Oldcastle's case, that they joined the rebels
pro timore mortis et recesserunt quam cito potuerant.' 28
A reasonable apprehension of immediate injury at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime will not excuse
the defendant if prior to that time he knew of the approach
of the danger and had a reasonable opportunity to avoid
it.21 In Arp v. State30 the evidence of the defendant show-
ed that on the night of the crime he went to Burkhalter's
house and was there informed by Burkhalter and Leigth
that he must kill Pogue; that they went to 15ogue's, which
was a considerable distance from Burkhalter's, and the de-
fendant there killed Pogue. The court said:
"Although it may have been true, that at the time
he struck the fatal blow, that he had reason to believe he
would be killed by Burkhalter and Leigth, unless he kill-
ed Pogue, yet, if he had the opportunity, if it was practi-
cable, after being informed at Burkhalter's house of their
intention, he could have made his escape from them with
26Commonwealth v. Reffitt, supra. The crirme was "selling
poojed tobacco."
27ROss v. State, supra; Baxter v. People, supra; State v. Nar-
gashian, supra; McGrowther's Case, supra; Stephen, Dig. Crim. L.,
Sec. 31; Kenney, Crim. L., p. 32; Desty, Am. Crim. L., Sec. 321.
28McGrowther's Case, supra.
2021 Cyc. 833; Wharton, Homicide, Sec. 52.
3oSupra.
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reasonable safety, and he failed to do so, but remained with
them until the time of the killing, the immediate neces-
sity or compulsion under which he acted at that time would
be no excuse to him."
The mere fact that the defendant voluntarily entered
into a conspiracy to commit a crime does not preclude him
from setting up duress as a defense, if he afterwards
abandoned his purpose and at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime acted under a reasonable apprehension
of immediate injury.31
In order that the danger may be held to have been im-
minent and impending it is ordinarily necessary that the
threatener should have been present.3 2 The fact that at
the place where the defendant committed the alleged
crime, the tracks showed that only one person was there
is evidence that the danger was not imminent and impend-
ing.13 And where the threatener was a mile away it was
held that this showed that the danger was not imminent.3"
It is not necessary, however, that the threatener
should have been actually present in the ordinary meaning
of that term. It is sufficient that he was in such prox-
imity to the place of the crime that with the means at
hand he had the defendant under his power and control.3 5
3 Leach v. State, 59 Tenn. 584, 42 S. W. 195 (1897). Subject to
the proposition in the preceding paragraph.
32Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 143, 78 S. W. 773 (1904); People v.
Moretti, supra. Statutes sometimes so provide. 10 Am. and Eng.
Enc. L., 2 ed., 347; Canadian Crim. Code, Sec. 23.
33Brewer v. State, supra.
34State v. Fisher, 23 Mont. 540, 59 Pac. 919 (1900).
3512 Cyc. 161; Paris v. State, supra. This is true even though
the statute requires that the threatener should be "actually present."
A person twenty or thirty paces distant, armed with a shot gun, is
"actually prezent." raris v. State, supra.
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The Reality of the Danger
It must be regarded as well settled, though there are
some dicta apparently to the contrary,36 that if the de-
fendant believed there was imminent danger of injury and
his belief was based on reasonable grounds, he will be
excused, though there was actually no danger of injury. 7
The Absence of an Alternative
The defendant, it is said, must have had no alterna-
tive except to commit the crime or suffer the threatened
injury.3 8If by reason of superior strength he was able to
protect himself against the threatened injury, or if he
could have escaped with reasonable safety, at least if he
knew or as a reasonable man should have known these
facts, he will not be excused.' 9 In a prosecution for mur-
der the court said:
"If it be true that one of his co-conspirators was near
by with a gun, and in a threatening attitude toward the
defendant, * * * that would work no diminution of the of-
fense. In such case * * * it was his duty to spare Heck
(the deceased) and at the same time to protect himself
by turning his weapon upon his threatening confederate.
He could not with any degree of legal palliation elect a
course absolutely safe to himself, and slay an innocent
man, rather than take some risk to himself in an equal
combat with a relentless companion."40
36United States v. Vigol, supra; United States v. Greiner, supra;
1 East, P. C. 294; 12 Cyc. 161; 8 R. C. 11. 125.
37Rizzolo v. Commonwealth, supra, and cases infra.
38BTewer v. State, supra; Leach v. State, supra; Arp. v. State,
supra; State v. Nargashian, supra; Bain v. State, supra. All of these
cases except the last were prosecutions for murder.
39Bain v. State, supra; Brewer v. State, supra; Leach v. State,
supra; State v. Nargashian, supra; 1 East, P. C. 72; 21 Cyc. 832.
40Leach v. State, supra. See also, Brewer v. State, supra. "The
compulsion which will excuse a criminal act must arise without the
negligence or fault of the person who insists upon it as a defense."
Gillett, Crim. L., Sec. 7, quoted in Ross v. State, supra.
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The Number of Threateners
"Compulsion by threats of injury," says Stephen,"1
"* * * is recognized as an excuse for crime only, as I be-
lieve, in cases in which the compulsion is applied by a body
of rebels or rioters." This is probably the present law of
England.42 The English cases seem to make a "clear con-
trast between coercion 'by rebels or rioters in some num-
ber and coercion by individuals."' 3
Two persons may differ so much in strength and
weapons that it would seem that a degree of duress suf-
ficient to excuse may have been exercised by the one over
the other."4 In the United States it is accordingly held
that the defendant need not have been threatened by a
plurality of persons.45 Indeed, it seems that threats by
one against four may be sufficient to excuse the four if
the one is so obviously an overmatch for the four as to
excite in the minds of the four a reasonable apprehension
of injury.46
Times of War and Times of Peace
Hale says :47
"There is to be observed a difference between times
of war, or public insurrection, or rebellion, and the times
of peace; for in times of war, and public rebellion, when a
person is under so great a power that he cannot resist or
avoid, the law in some cases allows an impunity for parties
compelled or drawn by fear of death, to do some acts in
412 Stephen, Hist. Crim. L., p. 106.
429 Halsbury, L. Eng. 73.
4"Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 281.
4"Kenny, Crim. L., p. 73.
4"Ross v. State, supra; People v. Martin, supra; Carlisle v.
State, supra; Fisher v. State, gupra; Bain v. State, supra; State v.
Paris, supra.
46United States v. Haskell, Fed. Cas. 15821 (1823).
471 Hale, P. C. ch. VIII, p. 49.
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themselves capital, which admit of no excuse in times of
peace. * * *
"Now as to time of peace.
"If a man be menaced with death, unless he commit
an act of treason, murder, or robbery, the fear doth not
excuse him, if he commit the act; for the law hath pro-
vided a sufficient remedy against such fears by applying
himself to the courts and officers of justice for a writ of
precept de securitate pacis."
This reasoning is very weak. In most cases, even in
times of peace, in which threats of immediate injury are
used to compel a person to commit a crime, there is neither
time nor opportunity to resort to the protection of the
law.48  The distinction drawn by Hale has not been adopt-
ed in this country.
The Character of the Defendant's Participation
A person may incur responsibility in respect to a cer-
tain crime: (1) By actually committing the criminal act;
(2) by aiding or abetting another to commit it; (3) by ad-
vising or commanding its commission; (4) by assisting one
who committed, or aided in the commission, or advised the
commission, of the criminal act.
The common law regarded all four methods of par-
ticipation as being equally reprehensible. At least it im-
posed the same punishment upon all four classes of partici-
pants.41 At present the same rule prevails, except that a
much more lenient punishment is imposed upon partici-
pants of the fourth class. The defense of duress is pro-
bably available to all four classes of participants. It has
been so decided as to participants of the first, second and
fourth classes 0  A case where duress is invoked by a
482 Stephens, Hist. Crim. L., p. 107.
4aAccessories after the fact to misdemeanors were not punished
at all.
5 Burns v. State, supra; and cases infra.
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participant of the third class is not likely to arise. The
cases seem to require the same character of duress to ex-
cuse a participant of the second 5' or fourth class5 2 as is
required to excuse a participant of the first class.
5 3
Evidence
The question whether or not the defendant acted un-
der duress, as defined by the law, is one of fact for the
jury," and in deciding it the jury should subject the situ-
ation of the defendant to a careful scrutiny.51 The du-
ress may be proved by the confession of the defendant;
but the jury are, of course, not required to believe that
part of the confession which relates to duress, if it seems
to them improbable or unreasonable. 6 The mere declara-
tion of the defendant that he "acted under duress" is not
sufficient. There must be some evidence that violence
was threatened and danger apparently existed. 5 7  The
fact that the defendant was weak in will power, easily per-
suaded, timid and shy is not admissible as independent evi-
dence to prove duress.'8  Evidence that the defendant was
requested, commanded or persuaded to commit the crime
51'Pirkle v. State, supra.
52Burns v. State, supra.
531n Rizzolo v. Commonwealth, supra, it is apparently held that
where the crime charged is murder, duress is available to a partici-
pant of the second but not to a participant of the first class to re-
duce the degree of murder. Statutes sometimes provide that duress
shall be a defense to one who commits or participates in crime.
Pirkle v. State, supra.
"4Beale v. State, supra; McCoy v. State, supra; Commonwealth
v. Reffitt, supra.
5&Robinson, Am. Jurisp., Sec. 45.
56Brewer v. State, supra.
57Pennsylvania v. Morrison, supra.
5Ross v. State, supra.
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by his mother is not sufficient to prove duress.5 9 Where
the defendant claims that he was compelled by a mob to
go with it and assist in a crime, he may introduce evidence
that before he had gone many yards he had agreed with
another to break at the first opportunity and that he did
break away in a short time.60
The Burden of Proof
There is a conflict of authority as to the burden of
proof. It has been held that the defendant is only requir-
ed to raise in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as
to whether or not he acted under duress and that, there-
fore, an instruction that "the evidence and circumstances
must convince the jury that he acted through fear" is inapt
and places too heavy a burden upon the defendant.6 1
In a recent Ohio case it is held that duress is an af-
firmative defense and the burden is upon the defendant
to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. "The
principle," says that court, "that the burden of proof is
on the state has reference to the establishment of the cor-
pus delicti and the defendant's complicity; but when the
defendant relies upon district substantive matter for ex-
emption or immunity, the burden of proving such matter is
upon the defendant.62 In several cases the burden has been
assumed by the defendant without discussion. 3
5OCarlile v. State, supra.
6 'Rex v. Crutchley, 5 C. and P. 133 (1832).
OlPirlde v. State, supra. But the giving of such instruction is
not an error of sufficient gravity to require a new trial if the court
has expressly charged that the burden is on the state to prove to the
satisfaction of the jury beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused
did participate in the commission of the -offense. Pirkle v. State,
supra.
6
'-tate v. Sappienza, 84 Ohio St. 63, 95 N. E. 381, 23 Ann. Cas.
1109 (1911).
63Note, 23 Ann. Cas. 111.2, citing Arp. v. State, supra; Ross v.
State, supra; State v. Thomas, supra; People v. Repke, supra.
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Instructions
The purpose of instructions where duress is relied up-
on as a defense, as in other cases, is to inform the jury of
the principles of law which are applicable to the evidence,
and no instruction should be given which does not pro-
mote that purpose. Instructions should not be given un-
less they may be fairly understood and easily comprehen-
ded by the jury. It is the duty of the court to refuse in-
structions which are so drawn, either from carelessness or
design, that they will be more likely to mislead than in-
struct the jury, although after a careful study and inves-
tigation the court may be able to extract a correct prin-
ciple of law from them.64
Walter Harrison Hitchler.
64Baxter v. People, supra.
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MOOT COURT
CUSTER v. ALTON
Statute of Limitations-Replevin-Right to Recover Personal Prop-
erty Lost by the Statute
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Benson, dn 1908, converted a mare the property of Alton. In
1913 the mare had a foal, which, in 1914, Benson sold to Custer who
purchased for value and bona fide. In 1915 Alton found the foal
on the highway and refused to return it to Custer.
Williams, for the plaintiff.
Willison, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCHNEIDER, J. The question whether a purchaser for value
and bona fide can replevy personal property from one who has pos-
session, but whose title was lost through the Statute of Limitations,
has not been decided by the courts of this Commonwealth.
The rule, that the increase of live-stock belongs to the owner
of the dam, is too well established for refutation. And when Alton
neglected to bring action within the time limit, described under the
Statute of Limitations, of 1713, he lost title to both mare and foal.
James Barr Ames in his essay, "The Disseisin of Chattels," ably
expresses the doctrine as follows. "When the period of limitation
has run, the statute, by forbidding the exerdise of the right virtual-
ly annihilates it, and the imperfect title must become perfect," And
since Benson's imperfect title to the mare became perfect, so his
imperfect title to the foal became perfect.
In order that Custer can recover in replevdn, his title must be
examined, for it was held in Reinheimer v. Hemingway, 35 Pa. 432,
that the plaintiff in replevin must recover on the strength of his
own title, not on the weakness of his adversary's. Custer was a
purchaser for value and bona fide from Benson, and it was held in
Chopin v. Freeland, 142 Mass. 382, as stated by Holmes, J., "A pur-
chaser from one against whom the remedy is already barred is en-
titled to stand in as good a position as his vendor."
Strayed animals found on the highway are treated as lost
property, and the finder must make reasonable efforts to find the
owner. Alton knew who the owner was but attempted to take the
law into his own handA and keep in his possession the offspring
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of his converted mare. But the Statute of Limitations which
estopped him from bringing an action for recovery of both mare
and foal again defeats him, for the doctrine as set down by Holmes,
J., in Chapin v. Freeland, 142 Mass. 382, is, "where the statute would
be a bar to a direct proceeding by the original owner, it cannot be
defeated by indirection within the jurisdiction where it is law. If
he cannot replevy, he cannot take with his own hand. A title which
will not sustain a declaration will not sustain a plea."
Therefore, since Custer's title is perfect, Alton's possession is
a conversion and Custer should recover the foal.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is at present well settled that adverse possession of per-
sonalty for the statutory period operates not merely to bar the rem-
edy of the person dispossessed but vests absolute title in the posses-
sor which is equally available for attack or defense, and that one
who has thus acquired title "may bring suit to recover the property
from the former owner who has retaken it after title has vested."
2 C. J. 287; 4 Modern American Law 21.
A learned writer has thus expressed the doctrine: "The vice
in the converter's title is the disposed owner's right to recover the
chattel by recaption or action. The bar of the statute operating as
a perpetual injunction against the enforcement of the right of ac-
tion virtually destroys that right; and the policy of the law will not
permit the deposed owner's right to recover by his own act to
survive the extinguishment of his right to recover by legal process.
The vice being thus removed, the converter's title is unimpeachable;
and it is true of chattels as of land that a prescriptive title is as
effective for all purposes as a title by grant Accordingly, the ad-
verse possessor, * * * if dispossessed by the original owner, * * *
may maintain conversion or replevin against the latter as he might
against any stranger. Ames' Essays on Legal History 201.
It therefore clearly appears that if Benson had sold the mare
to Custer and the present controversy concerned the mare, Custer,
the plaintiff, would be entitled to recover.
This action, however, is to recover the foal and not the mare,
Benson had possession of the foal for one year and Custer had pos-
session of it for one year. Takfing these two periods of possession,
the total period of adverse possession is two years 'which of course
is insufficient. Considering the title to the foal, independently of
that of the mare, it is obvious that Custer had not acquired it by ad-
verse possession.
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The learned court below does not so assert, but declares that
title to the foal is in Custer in obedience to the "well established
rule" that " the increase of live stock belongs to the owner of the
dam."
A more accurate statement of the principle is that the increase
of live stock belongs to the owner of the dam at the time of parturi-
tion. 3 Encyc. L. & P. 958.
The question therefore arises, who for the purposes of the pres-
ent case, is to be considered to have been the owner of the mare
at the time of parturition. At that time Benson had been in pos-
session of the mare for five years only and, consequently, the
statutory period had not exp ired, and therefore, the simple declara-
tion that the increase of live stock belongs to the owner of the
dam, does not adequately explain the lower court's decision in fa-
vor of the plaintiff.
This decision is, however, justified by the principle that a title
by adverse possession "relates back to the inception of the posses-
sion," (2 C. J. 254), for applying this rule in this case we are com-
pelled to consider Benson as having been the owner of the mare
in 1913 rwhen the foal was born. See 4 Modern American Law 24.
Judgment affirmed.
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THE NEW BUILDING
Through the loyalty of the alumni and friends of the
School, the coming fall will see us installed in the new
building, now in process of construction. The need has
been apparent for many years, and with the rapid increase
in the number of students, the inadequacy of our present
equipment became ever more apparent. The work of the
School threatened to be seriously hampered through lack
of proper and suitable accommodations. Students, faculty
and alumni all realized the necessity, and about a year ago
an active canvass was started to raise funds for a new
building. Through the splendid and untiring efforts of
those who had the welfare of the School at heart, suffi-
cient funds were raised to let the contracts, and begin the
work of construction. Mr. Horace B. King, Law '10, of
Harrisburg, Pa., deserves particular mention for the suc-
cess which attended these efforts. Throughout the whole
campaign Mr. King has given unsparingly of his time in
order that the project might succeed. And others have
not been idle. Many of the alumni, and the members of
the faculty, have willingly and unselfishly turned aside
from their own work in order that the new building might
be assured. The pride of accomplishment is theirs, and
future generations of students will accord them due honor.
The number of subscribers to the building fund was
in the neighborhood of four hundred. The amount of
their subscriptions ranged from a few dollars to several
thousand. Men who graduated in 1916 were as anxious
to aid, according to their ability, as men of a generation
ago. To them all must go unstinted praise and grateful
appreciation. In particular, we would mention Mr. Rob-
ert Hays Smith, Law '00, of San Francisco, Mr. Harry F.
Kanter, Law '97, of Reading, Mr. Horace B. King, Law
'10, of Harrisburg, Mr. Charles N. Ulrich, of Catasauqua,
H. Eugene Marker, Law, '95, of Greensburg,
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and Justice John W. Kephart, Law '94, of Ebensburg. The
subscriptions to date have aggregated approximately $40,-
000. If all subscriptions are promptly paid, this sum will
be nearly sufficient to cover the cost of the building, but
as with all educational institutions, there are constant
needs of various kinds. The law library will have to be
enlarged, if the increasing student body is to be furnished
with ample working materials. Interior furnishmgs of
various sorts will be needed, and use of the building may
suggest changes which it would be wise to make. Any
alumnus or friend of the institution who, stands ready to
aid in any way is urged to communicate with the Dean.
We append a description of the building, from the
specifications of the architect, Mr. R. R. Markley, of Har-
risburg, Pa. The accompanying illustrations give the plan
of the first and second floors, the building as it looks now,
in process of construction, and the completed work. It
is hoped to have the building ready by the middle of Au-
gust, and its completion will be made the occasion for an
alumni reunion. Plan to be with us then. It will enable
you to more fully understand the magnitude of the task
which has been accomplished, and the thanks which are
due to those who have aided in the work.
The site of the building is at the north-west corner of
S. College Street and W. South Street, the lot measuring
167 feet on College Street and 120 feet on South Street.
The building fronts on College Street, with the line a dis-
tance of 50 feet from the sidewalk. The building itself
has a frontage of 132 feet on College Street, and 62 feet
on South Street. The main approach is from the former
street. A large two-story portico with six white colonial
columns and a wrought iron balustrade is the main feature
of the front. The floor of this portico is of large red floor
tile. Limestone steps are carried the full width of the
portico. Another entrance is provided on South Street.
This gives an entry to the basement smoking room, and
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is covered by a porch on the first floor. The second floor
of this elevation has a large triple arch window and an
iron balcony, the whole being arranged to give the appear-
ance of a secondary front on South Street.
All the stone work visible above the foundations, and
all window sills, steps, ashlers, and caps are of white lime-
stone. The entire facing of all walls except the rear one
is of tapestry brick, ranging in shade from a light red to
almost black, which gives the wall surface a mottled or
weathered effect. The main cornice of the building is of
wood, and this, as well as all other exterior wood work, is
painted white. The main roof, and the sides and tops of
all dormers are of green Vermont slate of variegated colors
and in random widths. Copper is used for all rain spouts,
gutters, and the roof of the tower. This tower, which
contains a four-faced clock, will rise above the grade a dis-
tance of 112 feet, and the general composition is taken
from the bell tower of Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa.
When one enters the main entrance door, he finds
himself in a vestibule 20 feet square, treated with columns
and pilasters, and giving an open vista between the columns
to the stairway. In the vestibule and first floor halls the
plastering is of an ornamental nature, placed on metal
laths. The remainder of the building is plastered in
white, with a hard finish. The interior woodwork of bright
Poplar, Maple, and Birch, will be given four coats of white
enamel, with the exception of the rail and newels in the
stairway, which are to be finished in mahogany, and the
floors, which will be in a natural finish.
The first floor of the building contains six lecture
rooms, a cloak room, the Dean's offices, professors' offi-
ces, and toilet. An additional toilet is also provided in the
basement. Each room has a chair rail and picture mould-
ing. The lecture rooms on the south end of the building
are separated by rolling partitions, having a clear height
when open of 9 1-2 feet. In all lecture rooms blackboards
of fast black slate measuring 3 feet 6 inches in height are
placed.
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The second floor contains a library 54 feet by 60 feet,
and a large assembly room with a seating capacity of 450
persons. This assembly room is provided with a stage
and electric connection for a moving picture machine or
lamp. The ante-room in the tower on the second floor
may be used as a reading room in connection with the li-
brary, or as- a professor's office.
Entering from South Street one finds a large smok-
ing room, measuring 24 by 40 feet, with an entrance from
the basement hallway. Funds raised by the students from
the minstrel show given this spring will be used in fitting
up the smoking room. The basement also contains a toil-
et room, heating apparatus room, and storage rooms. These
latter will have sufficient glass area to permit of their
being used for class rooms if necessary. The building
has its own heating plant, the direct radiation system be-
ing used. Provision is made for a fan ventilating system,
and in addition all windows are pivoted so as to allow for
natural ventilation when the outside temperature will per-
mit.
All floors will be double, with sound proof felt be-
tween the two layers. Modern plumbing of the best char-
acter will be installed, and a sufficient water supply will
be available at all times. All electric wires will be placed
in steel conduits, and abundant outlets provided in every
room. In the tower there will be a 100 watt outlet back
of each clock face, with a 200 watt outlet in the portico on
top of the tower. In each hallway, and in the offices, tele-
phone connections will be provided. Drinking fountains
35 inches high will be found on each floor. Only the best
crystal glass will be used in all windows and transoms.
Carlisle abounds in beautiful examples of colonial ar-
chitecture, most of them dating back to colonial days.
This style of architecture is carried out in the new building,
which when completed will be one of the most beautiful
buildings in the Cumberland Valley, as well as one of the
most convenient and commodious law school buildings in
the United States.
Henry M. Bruner.
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